Introduction and definition of universal humanism
I have chosen such a title for this essay not to suggest that universal humanists are insane, but because in order to consistently hold such a view, the universal humanist would have to come to particular conclusions that would drive any human being to the point of insanity. I will make this case by firstly going over what universal humanism is meant to entail. After this, I will briefly discuss the problems of universal personism advocated by Peter Singer and demonstrate how similar problems also apply to universal humanism. I will conclude from this that to avoid these problems we must allow the appeals to group membership as morally relevant in our ethical life. Thus if one wishes to be a universal humanist, they must include the moral legitimacy of group membership.
It has been difficult to find a generally agreed upon definition of universal humanism and what it necessarily entails, so to avoid deconstructing straw men, I will attempt to come to a general understanding through Peter Baldwin’s mention of it in his article ‘J’accuse identity politics’. In his article, Baldwin critically analyses Sonia Kruk’s concept of identity politics, where he says:
As Kruks says, the identarians explicitly reject the universalist vision of humanity; and when she, talks of ‘respect for oneself as different’, she is affirming group rights based on identity, not the right of each individual to dissent from the group, to have their own point of view.
Rather, our essence is defined by our membership of one or more identity groups defined along lines race, gender, sexual preference, as so on. We are expected to speak, act and be recognized on this basis, and to stick to the relevant script of victimhood or oppression that designate us as either oppressor or oppressed.
From this, it seems that this understanding of universal humanism is that one ought to view oneself as a human being, and this comes before any identity based on group membership. So, when Baldwin speaks of “universalist vision of humanity”, it would follow that this vision is for all human beings to give each other equal consideration and treatment, and that whatever group we belong to is irrelevant. So, this understanding of universal humanism suggests that thinking in terms of group membership is fundamentally at odds with treating and considering each other equally as human beings.
Why only humans?
Peter Singer has long campaigned for the inclusion of non-human animals in our ethical and moral life. Singer does not believe in equal consideration and treatment of non-human animals in all matters but does believe that we should regarding pleasure and pain, since many non-human animals can experience pleasure and pain just as much as we can. Singer uses a thought experiment of the ‘ideal observer’ to rid us of our biases against non-human animals by imagining ourselves as someone who takes on all the pleasure and suffering in the world, and what we would do if we were to experience such a thing. Singer says that under such circumstances we would treat the suffering of non-human animals equal to humans, therefore would treat them as such.
Bernard Williams has responded to such reasoning to argue that prioritising human beings above non-human animals regarding suffering is not just a prejudice and necessary for our moral life in his essay called ‘the human prejudice’. Williams points out that invoking such an idea of the ideal observer cannot possibly be a way to live, where he says:
But what would it conceivably be like for this to be so, even for a few seconds? What would it be like to take on every piece of suffering that at a given moment any creature is undergoing? It would be an ultimate horror, an unendurable nightmare. And what would the connection of that nightmare to our actions be? In the model, the IO is supposed just to be an Observer: he can’t do anything. But our actions, the idea is, are supposed to shadow or be guided by reflection on what he in his omniscience and impartiality is taking on, and if for a moment we got anything like an adequate idea of what that is, and we really guided our actions by it, then surely we would annihilate the planet, if we could; and if other planets containing conscious creatures are similar to ours in the suffering they contain, we would annihilate them as well.
Williams then argues that understanding that we cannot be equally concerned of all conscious creatures, it is not just a matter of our morality but a matter of our sanity. Williams justifies the belief that our concern of human beings above non-human animals is grounded in the special relationship we have with other human beings. Therefore, if we were stuck in a dilemma to save a human’s life over a dog, and we chose the human, our answer of ‘it’s a human being’ would be enough of a morally relevant reason with no further reason to be demanded.
The family and the nation
If we are to take universal humanism consistently, we would also have to apply it to our group membership as family members and at the national level as fellow Australians. If we are to view all human beings equally, we would be applying something like the ideal observer except that it is restricted to human beings. However, the issues raised by Williams will still apply. Imagine for a moment what it would be like to react to every child that is dying around the world right now as though it were your own child, or your sibling? Given the number that certainly are, this would surely drive anyone to insanity, the grief would be astronomical! But this is not how we feel. Furthermore, taking extra measures to ensure the health, safety and general wellbeing of our own child over other children, under the reason ‘it is my child’ would be seen by most as more than enough as a morally relevant reason.
Similar can be said of the concept of the nation. Imagine if our country’s leaders decided to increase taxes by 20% to give aid around the world, since this would although cause much more suffering to us, would create much more happiness in total for human beings. Even the most radical cosmopolitans would not endorse such a policy, and if they do exist, they would surely be the fringe. We typically would accept that the state has a duty to its own citizens first and to others second, but this also flies in the face of universal humanism. Tony Lynch in his article ‘local concerns’ also explains the moral relevance of duties of the nation state, where he says:
There is often a lot to be said about the callousness of the 'fix our own backyard up first' attitude, but in itself it expresses a truth. Our 'own backyard' does make special demands on us, that is part of what makes it our backyard. We have, I should like to say, duties of connectedness, of which kin obligations are the obvious example, and further, we have duties of emergency which come into to play on our being directly confronted with tragedy or disaster. And in both of these cases, I suggest, the controlling moral idea is that being present, either in terms of special connection or immediate confrontation to a morally significant situation, implies a more stringent obligation than obtains without such special connection or confrontation.
My generation
If we are to take the term universal humanism in its strictest sense, there is no reason to why it only includes currently existing human beings, why not include all possible human beings in the generations to come? Lynch again addresses this by pointing out that such thinking is actually the opposite of being human, he says:
Consider from what point of view it is natural to view all human beings, past, present, future, as of equal standing when engaging in practical deliberation. Such a view is not a human point of view, for human points of view are particular and located, so that deliberation always comes down to answering the following 'determinate and 'agent-relative' question: What shall I do, here and now? It is instead a view point outside locality, a view from nowhere, where the nowhere isn't empty, but is (non-arbitrarily?) charged with benevolence.
Special relationships and identity
What we can conclude from all of this is that appealing to a universal humanism that demands equal consideration and treatment only on the basis that they are fellow human beings, is to undermine a significant part of us which makes us human in the first place: our capacity for special relationships. One may concede all these points on family, nation, and generation, but may say that these special relationships do not and ought not apply to the kinds of identity usually connected to identity politics. Such identities would be class, race, gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, and so on.
The application of identity politics usually implies the shared experience of groups that are based on disadvantage, oppression or other injustice. If this does not qualify as creating a legitimate special relationship, I’m not sure if anything does. This is not defending every aspect of identity politics, indeed there are many valid arguments against how it is currently practiced. But objecting to identity politics on the basis that favours group membership over universal humanism is to reject a fundamental part of human nature, and to attempt to do so would drive us to insanity.
Conclusion
There are many objections that can be laid against identity politics but arguing that it is at odds with universal humanism isn’t one of them. I cannot care equally about a child halfway across the world as much as my own, nor demand the Australian government care for people around the world equally to my fellow citizens. It is a matter of our humanity and of our sanity to allow special relationships, and the special relationships involved in identity politics are just as legitimate. Furthermore, if one wants to hold a universal humanist point of view, it must include our capacity for special relationships through group membership, therefore it is the denial that these can coexist that leads to insane conclusions if this is how universal humanism is to be understood.