China's Ukraine crisis
(Jude Blanchette and Bonny Lin, Foreign Affairs, 21 February 2022)At the Beijing winter olympics China and Russia entered into a "no limits" partnership agreement, including supporting each other's position on Taiwan and Ukraine respectively. This article contends that this agreement poses a significant dilemma for Beijing, underming the latter's global aspirations.

This is reflected in an emerging ambivalence about Russia's behaviour, with statements by foreign minister Wang Yi stressing the importance of negotiations and respecting Ukrainian sovereighty. According to the authors, it is extremely unlikely that Xi gave Putin a green light to proceed with a full scale invasion.

In fact, according to another article by  analyist Yun Sun of the Stimson Institute, Chinese policy makers were shocked by the invasion, subscribing to the theory that Putin was posturing and that US intelligence was inaccurate, as it was in Iraq.

The root of the tension is the difference in aspiractions of the two powers. Ukraine is actually one of the major European partners in the Belt-and-Road initiative. Furthermore, Chinese strategy relies on maintaining viable relations with the US and Europe for trade purposes and to facilitate its influence operations in the West, including its surprisingly successful "elite capture" activities to engage top political, governmental and corporate figures and instititutions.

How stable this alliance, given the divergence of interests? An interesting question.

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The Ukraine crisis is primarily a standoff between Russia and the West, but off to the side, another player stands awkwardly: China. Beijing has tried to walk a fine line on Ukraine. On one hand, it has taken Russia’s side, blaming NATO expansion for causing the crisis and alleging that U.S. predictions of an imminent invasion are aggravating it. On the other hand, especially as the risk of military conflict has grown, it has called for diplomacy over war.

If Beijing had its way, it would maintain strong ties with Moscow, safeguard its trade relationship with Ukraine, keep the EU in its economic orbit, and avoid the spillover from U.S. and EU sanctions on Moscow—all while preventing relations with the United States from significantly deteriorating. Securing any one of these objectives may well be possible. Achieving all of them is not.

The crisis in Ukraine is exposing the limits of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s foreign policy. Beijing’s global aspirations are now clashing with its desire to remain selectively ambiguous and aloof. Although Chinese leaders may not recognize it, their country’s closer alignment with Russia is far from prudent. The upsides of this move are notional and long-term: Russia might someday return the favor by supporting Chinese territorial aspirations or cooperating on revising the structures of global governance. The costs to China’s larger global strategy, however, are real and immediate.

Beijing would no doubt prefer that the current crisis didn’t exist. For starters, Ukraine is an important trade partner for China in its own right, with more than $15 billion in bilateral trade flows in 2020. The country is also a vital gateway to Europe and a formal partner of the Belt and Road Initiative, Xi’s flagship geopolitical endeavor. Last month, Xi extended greetings to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, noting, “Since the establishment of diplomatic ties 30 years ago, China-Ukraine relations have always maintained a sound and stable development momentum.” Privately, Chinese experts have lamented that Beijing, worried about offending Moscow, doesn’t do more to support an important partner in the Belt and Road Initiative.

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China's Ukraine crisis
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